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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a brief analysis of most known problem solving theoretical models realized using 
epistemological categories such as observer position, object of study, methods and procedures, and descriptive or 
explicative scope. The review showed linear and cyclical models, the need to recognize method´s limitations to 
generalizing, the relevance of expliciting observer position, and a diffuse delimitation of the object “problem solving” as a 
cognitive process. An integrative and molar theoretical model of problem solving as a dependent variable is proposed 
whose variations go with critical cognitive processes (information processing, comprehension, reasoning, cognitive styles, 
and attitudes).  Its molar feature refers to that it integrates basic and high order processes in a general cognitive activity; this 
proposal has to be extensively tested.  
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RESUMEN 
 
Este escrito presenta un breve análisis de los modelos teóricos más conocidos de solución de problemas, realizado 
con categorías epistemológicas como posición del observador, objeto de estudio, métodos y procedimientos, alcance 
descriptivo o explicativo.  La revisión mostró modelos cíclicos y lineales, la necesidad de reconocer las limitaciones para 
generalizar, la relevancia de explicitar la posición del observador y una delimitación difusa del objeto de estudio solución de 
problemas como proceso cognoscitivo. Se propone un modelo teórico de solución de problemas integrador y molar como 
variable dependiente cuyas variaciones dependen de procesos cognoscitivos críticos (procesamiento de información, 
comprensión, razonamiento, estilos cognitivos y actitudes). El carácter molar se refiere a que integra procesos básicos y 
superiores en una actividad cognitiva general; esta propuesta debe evaluarse extensivamente. 
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SOME CLASSIFICATIONS OF CURRENT 
THEORETICAL MODELS 
 
Tracing the evolution of the theoretical models of 
problem solving, we found that those that have shown the 
most transcendence in various domains of knowledge, as 
well as in different research processes, and that have 
achieved more academic diffusion, are the theories 
formulated by J. Dewey (1910/2007), Durkin (1937, cited 
by Guilford, 1986), Osborne (1963), Polya (1957/2007), 
Wertheimer (1959), Newell and Simon (1972), Donald 
Broadbent (1977), Hayes (1978), Hayes & Simon (1985), 
Greeno (1978, 1980), Sternberg (1986), Davidson and 
Sternberg (2003), Dietrich Dörner (1975, 1985), Bransford 
& Stein (1983, 1987), Simonton (1984), Vosniadou and 
Ortony (1989), Whimbey and Lockhead (1991), Kahneman 
and Tversky (1973), and Poissant, Poellhuber and 
Falardeau (1994). 
Some authors have made efforts to identify 
common elements between the models and the concepts, 
and they have proposed bimodal or bipolar classifications; 
for example, Roth and McGuinn (1997) identified both 
linear models that describe problem solving as a relatively 
unvarying sequence of steps, and cyclic models according 
to which end of one problem is the beginning of another. 
Funke and Frensch (1995) arrange the theoretical 
developments considering the tradition to which they 
belong, thus, the NorthAmerican models have a functional 
base, and the European theories correspond to a structuralist 
tendency. In a previous article we proposed (Botia & 
Orozco, 2005) using the molar and molecular categories, 
taken from chemistry to psychology by E. Tolman (1948) 
and B.F. Skinner (1957), to classify the models; we argued 
that if a model is oriented to global analysis it can be 
considered a molar model, but if a model identifies 
processes, operations or components that take part in 
problem solving in a sequential or integrated manner, it can 
be considered a molecular model. 
These analyses coincide in some points: (a) they 
criticize the limitations of the models because most of them 
are formulated from a starting point of research that uses 
structured tasks, related to known knowledge domains, and 
do not explain problem solving in everyday life, or complex 
problem solving; (b) they state that most of the proposals 
assumed that the mental operations to use or to develop are 
the same to deal with any kind of problem; (c) they point 
out that the available theories of the problem solving 
process stay at a descriptive level; (d) they censure that a 
unified theory of problem solving does not exist, nor has it 
been developed, such that it may be the basis of other 
studies, and help in the design of generalizable tests, and 
that it may be able to answer the hard criticisms that emerge 
and come from other disciplines because cognitive 
psychology does not have comprehensive theories of 
cognitive phenomena (Zayour, 2002). 
 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEW 
 
The analysis of the theoretical models of problem 
solving using epistemological categories such as object 
delimitation, method of research, method of theoretical 
construction, becomes an epistemological criticism, or at 
least, an epistemological analysis of the object delimitation 
and of how rigorous the methods of inquiry and theoretical 
construction are. In this perspective, the main questions 
were: (i) which is the observer perspective in these models? 
And (ii) whether the models study the same object or 
whether they refer to different aspects of the problem 
solving process, or other cognitive elements or processes? 
These analyses permit us to state that: a) the theoretical 
models with descriptive or explicative scope (Hayes, 1978; 
Greeno, 1978; Davidson & Sternberg, 2003) are mixed with 
theoretical models characterized by having as a main 
purpose to prescribe how the solver must proceed when he 
faces a problem (Osborne, 1963; Polya, 1957/2007; Newell 
& Simon, 1972), although none of the authors talk about 
the scope issue; (b) most of the theoretical models of 
problem solving have been formulated from the point of 
view of an external observer, and, from there, they identify 
the steps that a solver must go through (Polya, 1957/2007; 
Osborne, 1963; Newell, & Simon, 1972) to solve the 
problem.  More recent models try to inquire into problem 
solving from an “internal” point of view of the observer, 
looking for the cognitive processes that take part in the task 
of solving a problem (Greeno, 1978; Simonton, 1984; 
Poissant et al., 1994). It seems very difficult for the external 
position models to sufficiently explain phenomena like 
insight, but likewise, the “internal” theories have 
difficulties identifying and bringing into relation the more 
relevant cognitive processes to explain the same insight and 
other frequent facts of cognition evident in problem 
solving. 
For the second question, it was found that most of 
the theories prioritize and answer the question How are 
problems solved?, instead of attending to the question What 
is problem solving, or how can it be conceived?. Dewey 
(cited by Castillo, 2002) proposed understanding problem 
solving as a structure conformed by 5 phases: perceived 
difficulty, understanding and definition of the problem, list 
of possible solutions, hypothesis, test of applied solutions.  
Landau (1987) found a reduction of the Dewey proposal 
made by Johnson (1955) into three phases:  preparation, 
production, judgment; Polya (1957/2007), who is 
considered an important communicator of Dewey’s ideas 
(Wilson, Fernandez, & Hadaway, 1993), stated as steps to 
problem solving:  to formulate objectives, to define the 
situation, to plan, to generate ideas, to choose an alternative 
of solution, to execute the chosen alternative, and to test the 
results.  Sternberg (1986) and Davidson and Sternberg 
(2003) have described problem solving as a cycle, that does 
not function necessarily as an unvarying sequence, that 
includes the following steps: to recognize or to identify the 
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problem, to define and to mentally represent the problem, to 
develop a solving strategy, to organize the solver’s 
knowledge about the problem, to allocate the mental and 
physical resources to solve it, to check the progress towards 
the goals, and to test the adjustment of the solution to the 
particular situation. Poissant et al. (1994) included 
metacognition as a control and feedback instance, from 
whence the efficiency of the problem solving steps and 
results are ordered and tested.  
Newell and Simon (1972) developed the GPS 
Model (General Problem Solver) which has been 
transcendental in theoretical and methodological research 
advances of the different traditions of problem solving 
theories for the last 30 years. These authors stated that 
behavior is a function of memory operations, and of the 
control rules and processes, in such a way that problem 
solving could be modeled by a machine because both the 
computer and the human mind are kinds of “information-
processing systems”.  The GPS model tries to define the 
core processes that a solver can use to face different kinds 
of problems, and it is based on the assumption that a system 
of physical symbols has enough resources to attend to the 
environmental demands and to display intelligent behavior. 
The critical step when a problem is solved, according to this 
model, is the definition of the problem’s space, this means 
to define the goal to be obtained, and of the rules of 
transformation. When the solver uses an end-means 
analysis, he divides the final goal into subgoals and tries to 
reach them.  Some of the logical rules include: (1) to 
transform an object into another; (2) to reduce the 
difference between two objects; (3) to apply an operator to 
an object. 
From a different point of view, Wertheimer (1959) 
proposed to consider a problem as a whole, so that in this 
way, the restructuring of situations and the reorganization 
of perceptions can propitiate insight, which means to see 
the problem from a different perspective: in this way the 
subject makes groups, reorganizes, and gives another 
structure to the information, keeping in mind and managing 
it to arrange as a whole the different elements that are 
present in a problem.  This gestalt model assumes that a 
problem is an open figure able to excite, and cause tension 
such that the solver finds himself moved to restore 
equilibrium by getting a closed figure. In his own way, 
Durkin (1937, cited by Guilford, 1986) considered three 
ways to face a problem: trial and error, sudden 
reorganization, and progressive analysis, putting emphasis 
on the processes that a solver must do to reorganize the 
inconclusive information, keeping in mind not to assume 
sequences or steps to be followed by the solver. Dörner 
(1975, 1985; Dörner & Wearing, 1995) emphasized the 
interplay between the motivational and social components 
as relevant variables to understand problem solving, and 
Broadbent (1977) distinguished processes involved in 
problem solving that are present to awareness, and some 
others that can not be perceived, that work outside of 
awareness. From a perspective of elements combination, 
Simonton (1984) argues that the basic units of the creative 
process, named mental elements, must be freely combined 
in different combinatory possibilities, so that the 
permutation probabilities of an element is the central point 
of creative problem solving. 
Greeno’s studies (1978) showed the relevance of 
general or specific knowledge about a particular domain in 
problem solving; he points out the necessity of establishing, 
clearly, when a solver operates efficiently because he takes 
into account the appropriate knowledge, or because he has 
good competencies to solve the problem. The cited author 
identified three kinds of problems: problems of 
organization, problems of induction, and transformational 
problems, and for each type he identified a different 
problem solving strategy. Vosniadu and Ortony (1989) and 
Vosniadu (1989) describe problem solving as a set of 
operations that are activated to transfer the principles of a 
successful past or known solution to a new problem; they 
explain that the more the knowledge domains differ from 
each other, probably the more creative will be the results. 
Whimbey and Lockhead (1991) outline the convenience 
and necessity of developing dimensional models for each 
problem; in these kinds of models a concept has a relative 
position in a space limited by the dimensions, and this 
position makes it possible to start from the essential 
premises to get the answers (solutions) by means of 
analogies. 
This review shows that there are different 
approaches and ways to understand problem solving, and 
also shows that these theories have not asked, at least in a 
consistent manner, what is problem solving, how is it 
“configured”? As has been seen, most of them have 
proposed sequences of cognitive operations that are 
assumed to be relatively invariant and universal; others, a 
smaller number, try to isolate and emphasize one or another 
process particularly relevant to problem solving.  So, it is 
necessary to recognize that the models we have studied 
have not lead to a theory that identifies, describes and 
explains the relevant cognitive processes that take part in 
the problem solving situations where a solver, novice or 
expert, faces diverse or complex problems and solves them, 
either in a predictable, or else an innovative or optimum, 
way.  Problem solving research still has a way to go, and 
must be precise about the solver processes, the interaction 
between his qualities and the problem’s characteristics, and 
the probable vicissitudes that can emerge when a solver 
faces unexpected, very complex, unstructured or 
unpredictable problems (Jonassen, 1997; Roth & McGuinn, 
1997). 
It is especially important to analyze problem 
solving models from an epistemological perspective in 
order to advance and clarify issues such as replication and 
procedure consistency in such a way that it could be 
possible to evaluate the strength of the methods used to 
reach hypotheses and conclusions incorporated in 
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theoretical formulations. As a first exercise in this analysis, 
some publications and references of the cited authors were 
studied, and we reached some interesting findings.  
From the reviewed literature it is possible to infer 
that the arguments of J. Dewey (1910/2007), in general, 
were based on the analysis of rigorous observations and on 
philosophical reflections; brainstorming was a discovery or 
an insight of Alex Osborne dated from 1939 when he 
became, an advertising executive;  G. Polya, a renowned 
mathematician worried about math education according to 
Wilson et al. (1993), put into contrast Dewey’s and his own 
observations in his educational activity, and based on this, 
formulated a description of the problem solving process; 
based on logic, systems theory, and recent developments in 
information processing, Newell & Simon (1972) with the 
help of deductive processes, achieved the construction of 
the General Problem Solver (GPS) model; this theoretical 
model was tested through the development of a computer 
simulation, and subsequently, they compared the machine 
results with human results in various tasks using protocols 
of analysis where the verbal report of the subjects  was 
registered as containing indicators of the cognitive 
processes. 
From then on, authors such as Donald Broadbent 
(1977), Hayes (1978), Greeno (1978), Simonton (1975), 
Vosniadou and Ortony (1989), Whimbey and Lockhead 
(1991), Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Poissant et al. 
(1994) have an empirical and experimental research 
background, that facilitates the replication of their studies, 
and as an important consequence, they obtain a stronger 
theoretical consistency for their conclusions from a 
positivist point of view. R. Sternberg (1980) and Davidson 
and Sternberg (2003) deserve special attention because of 
their continued work on problem solving and intelligence 
research for more than 20 years. 
This brief revision shows two groups of theories: 
descriptive theories and explicative theories (we do not 
include prescriptive theories, those that pretend to establish 
how the solver must proceed when faced with a problem); 
the descriptive and explicative theories, analyzed with 
methodological criteria, showed stages that began with 
naturalistic observation, case studies, design of 
psychometric tests, algorithmic or heuristic task design and 
analysis, but recently use computer modeling or simulation, 
and activities maps. It is possible to affirm that the first 
stages lent fragility to early theories because their 
conclusions were imbued with philosophical assumptions 
that were difficult to be contrasted (Dewey, cited by 
Castillo, 2002; Polya, 1957/2007 models) and, in a similar 
way it is possible to say that some of their principles may 
have become beliefs or mythical statements like the 
Osborne model (Roth & McGuinn, 1997); these statements 
imply that their studies have difficulties in being replicated 
and allow sources of fragility in their authors’ formulations. 
In spite of this characteristic, these early theories have 
supported and enhanced experimental and computational 
studies of problem solving.  In this context, the 
development and qualification of the research instruments 
(techniques, tests, tasks) is a principal issue, considering 
that everyday problems are much more complex and 
frequently unstructured and unpredictable, with a greater 
number of variables that do not necessarily imply one 
unique correct solution. This is a great issue to work on, 
and the results will be presented elsewhere. 
A task remaining for investigators is to establish if 
the methodological differences make the theoretical 
differences greater, or not, and how-why selecting one or 
another methodological approach could or could not help to 
arrive at more comprehensive theories. It seems that 
cognitive processes are interrelated with those individual 
differences that proceed from genetic, learning and cultural 
variables, and these relations influence the logic of problem 
solving. This overview proposes a research challenge, 
considering an adaptive perspective that gives priority to 
the successes or failures that result when a person solves in 
any way a situational need or obstacle.  
In spite of the multiplicity of theories, methods and 
measurement tests developed in problem solving research 
in cognition, a better theory is still necessary, more 
integrative, with a stronger explicative capacity about 
problem solving (Funke & Frensch, 1995), especially when 
it takes into account complex problems (Davidson & 
Sternberg, 2003). The need for principles, laws, models 
with empirical evidence, demands a rigorous evaluation of 
current theoretical models, a test of their descriptive and 
explicative capability, a test of their generality.  Until now, 
the literature does not show studies oriented towards this 
purpose. 
 
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF 
PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESSES 
 
It is possible to generate and to test a theoretical 
model of problem solving starting with the identification of 
its critical or more relevant components, those processes 
that must be present in order to solve any problem, those 
that without their presence it becomes so difficult to solve a 
problem. Here, we propose that it is possible to understand 
problem solving as a general cognitive activity that has the 
principal role of integrating effectively basic and higher 
order cognitive processes, among which are especially 
important the processes of information processing, 
comprehension, reasoning (inductive and deductive), 
analogical transfer, cognitive styles, and attitudes to 
problem solving. These six processes have been selected 
because the literature has identified them as useful 
predictors of problem solving success in different kinds of 
tasks (Jonassen, 1997; Poissant et al., 1994). The problem 
solving process is a very complex activity that has a 
predictable margin of error (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), 
unavoidable in most everyday situations.  
  From this perspective, problem solving can be 
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understood as a dependent variable that has magnitudes and 
indicators that are a function of the above mentioned 
processes (information processing, comprehension,, etc); 
so, the performance level in each component is put together 
with other results, forming a profile of each subject, and so, 
it is possible to find a problem solving pattern. This way of 
measurement can be used as a predictor of the subject's 
performance in tasks and activities where problem solving 
is critical to success.   
This formulation must be tested with empirical 
procedures that must take into account that it is constructed 
to be a molar proposition, because of its purpose of 
embracing the different components of cognitive 
phenomena, and of relating them, systematically and 
wholistically, to produce an integrative and synthetic view 
of problem solving. To assume a molar position for such 
theory does not deny the necessity, and the obligation to 
pass on to the molecular analysis of the components: their 
functioning, their structure, and their relations. This model 
has begun to be tested: a battery was designed (BSP04) that 
measures the six processes considered as most relevant, and 
this test permits us to obtain a profile that statistically can 
organize groups including the combined effect of the 
independent variables in the problem solving profile. 
This proposal recognizes itself as a partial view of 
a very complex object of study, that at least includes three 
independent but related entities: the solver, the problem (or 
the task) and the relation between them; the analysis of this 
map of these three objects produces a great number of 
possibilities and combinations in any reader’s perspective.   
We recognize that to do research on problem 
solving as a cognitive process in such a perspective is a 
difficult challenge because facing simple or complex 
problems in everyday life - most of the time- does not have 
unique solutions; most likely, there are just good and better 
solutions, ones that are more effective and strategic than 
others; rarely a person finds one, unique and best solution 
in everyday life.  This point of view is especially relevant 
when political and technical decisions related to social 
development are analyzed and considered as problem 
solving processes. 
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